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The Sixth Circuit has again been pulled into a fight over an Ohio 
law that prohibits medical providers from performing abortions if they 
know that the patient is seeking an abortion because of a Down Syndrome 
diagnosis. The Court has already ruled on the case, but a petition for en 
banc review has brought it back. The arguments in the case center on 
whether the right to choose to abort a pregnancy is absolute pre-viability 
or whether pre-viability abortion restrictions are subject to an undue 
burden analysis. 
In 2017, Ohio passed a bill to enact OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.10, 
which prohibits medical providers from intentionally performing or 
inducing an abortion if they have “knowledge that the pregnant woman 
is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part, because of” Down Syndrome. 
To verify compliance with the law, physicians are required to attest in 
writing that they were not aware that fetal Down Syndrome was a reason 
for the person’s decision to terminate.   
The law was scheduled to go into effect on March 23, 2018, but a 
group of abortion providers (non-profit organizations, physicians, and 
medical facilities) filed a preliminary injunction in federal court asking 
to block its enforcement and get a declaratory judgment that the law is 
facially unconstitutional. The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio granted the motion, holding that a person is 
categorically entitled to choose whether to terminate a pre-viability 
pregnancy regardless of the state’s proclaimed interest. Preterm-
Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2018). The 
State of Ohio appealed. 
In its appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the State argued that the district 
court erred in creating a categorical right to a pre-viability abortion that 
precludes any limitations based upon the reasons for the abortion. They 
argued that the state interest in preventing discrimination based on 
disability does not fall under the rationale of either Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973), or Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
Rather, they argued that the lower court should have evaluated the law 
under a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the state’s interest 
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in preventing discrimination outweighs a person’s right to privacy. The 
Sixth Circuit disagreed. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 940 F.3d 318, 324 
(6th Cir. 2019). 
The 2-1 Sixth Circuit majority opinion echoed the lower court 
analysis, holding that the state’s purported interests are irrelevant to pre-
viability pregnancies, which enjoy categorical constitutional protection 
under Roe and Casey. In Roe, The United States Supreme Court held that 
a person’s decision to obtain an abortion is a fundamental right, though 
that right is qualified and must be balanced against the state interests in 
regulation. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. The Court held that the state interest in 
the health of the mother becomes sufficiently compelling at the end of the 
first trimester and interest in potential life at the point of viability. Id. at 
163–64. Twenty years later, in Casey, the Supreme Court upheld Roe and 
refined the rule, explaining that: 
 
[b]efore viability, the State’s interests are not strong 
enough to support a prohibition of abortion . . . Regardless 
of whether exceptions are made for particular 
circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from 
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy 
before viability. 
 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added).  
 
Following this precedent, The Sixth Circuit held that the state’s 
purported interest in preventing discrimination is “inescapably 
intertwined” with the state’s interest in potential life in Roe and Casey, 
and thus cannot be compelling until viability. Himes, 940 F.3d at 324. 
 However, Judge Batchelder’s dissent argues that pre-viability 
abortions are subject to restrictions under the Supreme Court precedent 
set in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Gonzales, she argues, 
requires the court to review laws like the one at issue here—laws that do 
not constitute a total ban on abortion—using an undue-burden analysis. 
Himes, 940 F.3d at 326 (Batchelder, J. dissenting). That test, as outlined 
in Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, and further refined in Whole Women’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 2292 (2016), requires a court to determine that a 
law that burdens the right to abortion furthers a valid state interest, 
confers benefits that outweigh the imposed burdens, and is based on 
credible evidence. Himes, 940 F.3d at 326 (Batchelder, J. dissenting).  
The district court in this case disagreed with dissent’s 
characterization, finding that the Ohio law “eradicates the right [to choose 
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a pre-viability abortion] entirely.” Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 754–55. 
Judge Batchelder counters by claiming that the burden placed on women 
seeking a pre-viability abortion is not, in fact, insurmountable. Himes, 
940 F.3d at 327–28. Although the statute bans abortions done for a 
specific reason, a violation occurs only when a physician knows that a 
woman’s reason for the abortion is a Down Syndrome diagnosis. 
Therefore, it is possible for a physician to simply refer the patient to 
another physician should that reason become known. The dissent argues 
that this may be enough to find that the law does not impose an undue 
burden. Id.  
 In December, the Sixth Circuit granted the State of Ohio’s petition 
for an en banc rehearing. The rehearing will take place before all of the 
judges on the court, rather than just a three-judge panel. In its appeal, the 
state framed the statute as an “Antidiscrimination Law” and called into 
question the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the right to a pre-viability 
abortion is “categorical.” Appellants’ Pet. for Reh’g and Reh’g En Banc, 
Preterm Cleveland v. Acton, No. 18-3329 at 1–2 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2019). 
They argued that the real reason for en banc review is “the ‘exceptional 
importance’ of the question whether States can pass anti-eugenics laws.” 
Id. at 2. 
En banc review is rare, with the Sixth Circuit granting only around 
1 percent of petitions. However, abortion is a hot-button topic nationally, 
with several pending cases challenging the limits of Roe and its progeny. 
Thus, the oral arguments in the en banc re-hearing, scheduled for March 
10, 2020, will likely center on the application of the undue burden test 
and whether the abortion ban based upon disability diagnosis is, indeed, 
an insurmountable burden.  
Regardless of the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision, the losing side 
will likely petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Legal scholars have 
speculated that this may be a conservative Supreme Court ready to 
reconsider Roe and Casey should the right case arise. Doing so has the 
potential to affect the direction of abortion jurisprudence moving 
forward. 
 
 
